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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 06/03/2011 Accident number: 664 
Accident time: 09:30 Accident Date: 16/06/2010 
Where it occurred: AIF no. 0040, Barikzia 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Other Date of main report: 12/07/2010 
ID original source: Ref.137 Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: IED Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 06/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a “Lessons 
Learned” summary provided as a PDF file. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some 
of the original formatting being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be 
revised as more information becomes available. 
The cover letter and Lessons Learned summary are reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
1 
 
Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) 
Ref # 137 
File: OPS/14/01/10 
Subject: Board of inquiry about De-mining Accident of [Demining group] -CBTD-05 in Naw 
Zad District. 
Attached please find the investigation report about the demining accident that happened in 
Barikzia village Naw Zad district of Helmand Province on 16. June. 2010, at 09.30 hours. 
Date: 12 July 2010 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [DEMINING GROUP] DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION 
[Name removed], Director for the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) 
convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) team to investigate the circumstances involved in the 
demining accident causing the death of [the Victim]  a deminer from [Demining group]'s 
Community Based Demining Team (CBDT-05). The investigation had been conducted by 
MCFA Naw Zad project office, but the information had been compiled by MACCA OM section. 
SUMMARY 
AIF (Abandoned IED Field) number 0040 is one of the heavily AIED contaminated areas 
within Naw Zad district. The residential areas, agricultural lands, irrigation systems and 
orchards were mainly contaminated during the conflict time between Taliban and Coalition 
forces. After the Taliban insurgents left the area in 2009, the local residents returned to their 
villages in Naw Zad district. Because of the heavy contamination within the area, several 
accidents occurred there. The orchards, the agricultural lands, irrigation systems and the 
houses have been blocked by AIEDs. 
On 10 of June 2010 the first day of operation in task 0040, all the team members had been 
briefed by team leader about the location and extent of contamination in the area. The 
deminers were tasked to establish admin. parking areas, control marking and create the 
baseline. The team members also started clearance operations in some lanes and the 
deminer [the Victim] was tasked to follow the marking of already cleared lanes. But because 
of the break time he left the area and entered into the task seeking a shadow to take break 
there. He wanted to enter to a mosque located inside the hazard area, on the way to the 
mosque he stepped on an IED, caused it to go off, so the fatal accident occurred and [the 
Victim] died in the spot. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the BOI conclusion that the deminer, [the Victim] made the mistake in terms of entering to 
un-cleared area and lack of command and control contributed to this accident. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The BOI recommend the following points to be considered widely by all organizations and by 
[Demining group] especially: 
a.)  The command, control and supervision shall be strengthened, specific trainings. 
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b) Under no circumstances the deminers and other team members are allowed to enter the 
hazard area, unless an access lane is cleared to proceed through. 
c) [Demining group] Office is to organize a comprehensive training and clearly explain the 
safety procedures during the operations, if there is any points with [Demining group] 
operations, they can come to MACCA operations department to discuss the issue. 
d) [Demining group] should increase the command group to three people, there should be 
one section leader per each section and team leader should be supervising entire team. 
Current structure of command group i.e. a team leader and his deputy are not sufficient 
especially in community based demining projects, as all the team members are hired from the 
community without having enough experience of demining operations. 
e) The internal QA shall be more active and professionalized to get the weak points and 
recommend remedial actions on time. 
The level of supervision should be strengthened in all teams, the [Demining group] should 
take necessary steps and come up with a practical plan of action and present it to MACCA 
Programme Director by no later than the 20th of July 2010. 
f) MCPA project office for Naw Zad should be more proactive for releasing professional 
advice to the teams especially about the safety and standard working procedures. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 847 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
As identified by the investigators, the primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control 
Inadequacy because the Victim was allowed to enter the hazardous area seeking shade in 
which to rest. The investigators recommend increasing supervision to prevent this because 
the number of supervisors was not appropriate when using local people as deminers. This 
might be considered a Management Control Inadequacy because the field supervisor 
numbers and recruitment are controlled by senior managers. 
The secondary cause of the accident is listed as Inadequate training because it seems that 
the Victim was a recent local recruit who was unaware of the risks involved in entering the 
hazardous area. 
It is presumed that the Victim was not wearing PPE at the time because it occurred during a 
rest period. 
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The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS which they are required to apply. The 
summary of the accident is good, and its presence implies that a full and comprehensive 
accident investigation was made, but not made available for others to learn from. 
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